HR 5287 China Advanced Technology Monitoring Act 2025

Proposed 2025-09-10 | Official source

Summary

Instructs the Secretary of Defense to annually report on China's semiconductor capabilities, including AI chipmaking and international collaborations, and assess U.S. export controls' effectiveness, with policy recommendations. Requires publication of unclassified details.

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  • This document has not been enacted or otherwise finalized and is subject to change. This summary is based on a copy of the document collected 2026-02-13 - refer to the official source for the most current version.

Key facts

🏛️ This document has been proposed by the United States Congress, but is not yet enacted. For authoritative text and metadata, visit the official source.

📜 This document's name is HR 5287 China Advanced Technology Monitoring Act 2025 (Annual report on the advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of China). AGORA also tracks this document under the name HR 5287 China Advanced Technology Monitoring Act 2025.

Themes AI risks, applications, governance strategies, and other themes addressed in AGORA documents.
  • This document has not been enacted or otherwise finalized and is subject to change. This summary is based on a copy of the document collected 2026-02-13 - refer to the official source for the most current version.

Thematic tags are in progress.

Full text

  • This is an unofficial copy. The document has been archived and reformatted in plaintext for AGORA. Footnotes, tables, and similar material may be omitted. For the official text, visit the original source.
  • This text may be out of date. According to the latest data in AGORA, this document has been proposed, but is not yet enacted or otherwise finalized. This text was collected 2026-02-13 and may have been revised in the meantime. Visit the official source for authoritative text.
A BILL To require an annual report on the advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the People's Republic of China. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``China Advanced Technology Monitoring Act''.
SEC. 2. ANNUAL REPORT ON ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING CAPABILITIES OF CHINA. (a) Report.--Not later than May 1, 2026, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, including advanced and mature-node semiconductors, of the People's Republic of China.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall also include the following: (1) A statement of key findings and assessments with respect to the United States strategy to counter China and specific policy recommendations to Congress regarding China's goal to advance semiconductor manufacturing. (2) An assessment of the domestic semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of China. (3) A detailed analysis of the industrial policies of China and the outcomes of such policies on such manufacturing capabilities. (4) A year-by-year assessment of technological development efforts by China in the fields of semiconductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence chipmaking, including relevant government plans and initiatives, that specifically addresses gains in every aspect of manufacturing, such as design, intellectual property, research and development, silicon and critical minerals, industrial gases, intermediaries such as photomasks, equipment, tools, and software, and advanced packaging techniques. (5) A description of engagement between China and other foreign countries with respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities, including-- (A) coordination with other countries and markets to expand semiconductor influence; and (B) foreign investment, trade, and research ties and partnerships with other countries.
(6) An analysis of the extent to which there is collaboration, joint ventures, or partnerships between China and other foreign countries with respect to semiconductor manufacturing. (7) An analysis of the impact of United States and allied and partner export controls on covered items related to the development of semiconductor manufacturing in China, specifically with respect to the effectiveness of current United States protections against-- (A) export control workarounds and loopholes; (B) circumvention through foreign investments or third-party acquisitions; and (C) risks posed by collaborative agreements, partnerships, supplier relocations, and contractual relationships that may indirectly benefit China. (8) An assessment of whether such export controls remain effective in curbing the development of semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities in China and recommendations for enhancing effectiveness of such controls. (9) An assessment of the implications of Chinese semiconductor manufacturing dominance on-- (A) United States global competitiveness; (B) United States national security and national economic security; and (C) the national economy of the United States.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include a classified annex, providing additional details and supporting intelligence, as available. The unclassified portion, or an unclassified synopsis, of the report shall concurrently be made available on a publicly available website of the Federal Government and a notice to that effect shall be concurrently published in the Federal Register.